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A. Latham 
 
REVIEW ARTICLE 
 
Life, the Universe and Everything 
 
Religion without God, by Ronald Dworkin, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2013, ix + 180 pp., 
$17.95 (hardback), ISBN 978-0-674-72682-6 
 
Alexander Latham 
 
 
In his final book, based on his 2011 Einstein lectures and published posthumously, Ronald Dworkin, 
proud secularist liberal and scourge of the American Christian right, reveals himself as deeply religious. 
This is not, however, a deathbed conversion, the consequence of reflection on existential mysteries 
previously overlooked by the arrogance of youth. Religion without God is an extended treatment of 
themes touched upon in Life’s DoŵiŶioŶ (1993), Freedoŵ’s Laǁ (1996) and Justice for Hedgehogs 
(2011), in whiĐh the atheist DǁoƌkiŶ Đlaiŵs as ŵuĐh eŶtitleŵeŶt to the epithet ͚ƌeligious͛ as aŶǇ 
pƌaĐtisiŶg Jeǁ, ChƌistiaŶ oƌ Musliŵ. ͚[‘]eligioŶ͛, he asseƌts ďoldlǇ, ͚is deepeƌ thaŶ God͛ ;ϭͿ. DǁoƌkiŶ͛s 
work thus sits alongside recent works by Habermas (2010) and Nagel (2010) in a series of books by 
͚godless͛ philosopheƌs eǆploƌiŶg the plaĐe of ƌeligioŶ iŶ a seĐulaƌ age. 
The keǇ to ǁhat DǁoƌkiŶ Đalls ͚the ƌeligious attitude͛ is the aĐĐeptaŶĐe of ͚tǁo ĐeŶtƌal 
judgŵeŶts aďout ǀalue͛ ;ϭϬͿ, Ŷeitheƌ of ǁhiĐh ƌeƋuiƌe a ďelief in God. The first is the objective 
importance of human life: the idea that the way people live matters in a fundamental way that cannot 
ďe ƌeduĐed to people͛s desiƌes oƌ opiŶioŶs, oƌ aŶǇ sĐieŶtifiĐ faĐts aďout eǀolutioŶ oƌ huŵaŶ Ŷatuƌe. 
The second is the ďelief that the uŶiǀeƌse itself is ͚suďliŵe: soŵethiŶg of iŶtƌiŶsiĐ ǀalue aŶd ǁoŶdeƌ͛ 
(10). In fleshing out these claims, Dworkin covers a tremendous amount of terrain for such a short 
book. His discussion touches on epistemology, metaethics, theology, the philosophy of science, 
aesthetics, practical political philosophy and constitutional theory, and all in his characteristically 
engaging style. Inevitably, in places his analysis is terse (he is to be forgiven here, since his work was 
cut short by the illness that would lead to his death), and readers with a special interest in any of the 
topiĐs Đoǀeƌed ŵaǇ feel fƌustƌated that DǁoƌkiŶ has Ŷot pƌoǀided ŵoƌe detail. Yet DǁoƌkiŶ͛s pƌiŶĐipal 
aim with the book is not to win particular philosophical battles, but to present a world-view, a way of 
thinking about life, the universe, and, well, everything. In that regard he succeeds in style, and he gives 
us plenty to think about along the way. 
 
The Book in Outline 
IŶ Đhapteƌ oŶe DǁoƌkiŶ liŶks ͚ƌeligious atheisŵ͛ to his metaethical position, which he calls 
͚uŶgƌouŶded ƌealisŵ͛. DǁoƌkiŶ ƌejeĐts all foƌŵs of ͚Ŷatuƌalisŵ͛: theoƌies that Đlaiŵ ŶothiŶg is ƌeal 
other than that which can be studied by the natural sciences. But he also rejects the strong realist 
ǀieǁ ;͚gƌouŶded ƌealisŵ͛, as he Đalls itͿ that ǁe ĐaŶ haǀe peƌĐeptual ĐoŶtaĐt ǁith ŵoƌal tƌuth. The oŶlǇ 
ƌeasoŶ ǁe haǀe foƌ ďelieǀiŶg iŶ ŵoƌal oďjeĐtiǀitǇ is, foƌ DǁoƌkiŶ, that ͚ǁe ƌefleĐt ƌespoŶsiďlǇ oŶ ouƌ 
ŵoƌal ĐoŶǀiĐtioŶs aŶd fiŶd theŵ peƌsuasiǀe͛ ;ϭϱͿ. Thus, ĐoŶfidence in a particular moral judgment 
ƌelies oŶ its ĐoheƌeŶĐe ǁith eǀeƌǇthiŶg else ǁe ďelieǀe. If that souŶds ĐiƌĐulaƌ, it͛s ďeĐause it is. But 
͚theƌe is Ŷo fiŶallǇ ŶoŶĐiƌĐulaƌ ǁaǇ to ĐeƌtifǇ ouƌ ĐapaĐitǇ to fiŶd tƌuth of aŶǇ kiŶd iŶ aŶǇ iŶtelleĐtual 
domain͛ ;ϭϲͿ. The assuŵptioŶs aďout ĐausatioŶ upoŶ ǁhiĐh sĐieŶtifiĐ eǆpeƌiŵeŶts ƌelǇ ĐaŶŶot ďe 
verified independently of such experiments, and we cannot demonstrate the axioms of mathematics 
by any non-mathematical method (16-17). We have no way of setting aside all of our convictions to 
hold a paƌtiĐulaƌ pƌopositioŶ to the light. To iŶǀoke the iŵageƌǇ of Neuƌath, ŵade faŵous ďǇ DǁoƌkiŶ͛s 
old teacher Quine, we are like sailors forced to rebuild our boat at sea. 
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We aƌe thus left ǁith Ŷo fouŶdatioŶ otheƌ thaŶ ͚felt, iŶesĐapaďle ĐoŶǀiĐtioŶ͛, oƌ, to put it 
aŶotheƌ ǁaǇ, ͚faith͛ ;ϭϵͿ. Neǀeƌtheless, the aŶalogǇ ďetǁeeŶ ďelief iŶ oďjeĐtiǀe ǀalue aŶd faith iŶ God 
ŵight seeŵ iŶadeƋuate to ŵake the foƌŵeƌ ƋualifǇ as ͚ƌeligious͛. Afteƌ all, isŶ͛t theƌe a ƌeleǀaŶt 
distinction to be made between those who believe God is the source of objective value, and those 
who do not? Not so, says Dworkin. He makes his case by delineating two aspects of theistic religions: 
the ͚sĐieŶĐe paƌt͛ aŶd the ͚ǀalue paƌt͛ ;Ϯϯ-4). The science part offers answers to factual questions, 
including the existence of God. The value part offers convictions about how people should live. Now 
the distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ the sĐieŶĐe paƌt aŶd the ǀalue paƌt is a distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚is͛ aŶd ͚ought͛ 
and so, argues DworkiŶ, Huŵe͛s laǁ applies. We ĐaŶŶot deƌiǀe Ŷoƌŵatiǀe-evaluative conclusions from 
purely descriptive propositions about the existence of God: 
 
͚A God͛s eǆisteŶĐe oƌ ĐhaƌaĐteƌ ĐaŶ figuƌe iŶ the defeŶse of suĐh ǀalues oŶlǇ as a faĐt that 
makes some different, independent background value judgment pertinent; it can figure only, 
that is, as a ŵiŶoƌ pƌeŵise… oŶe ĐaŶŶot suppoƌt a ǀalue judgŵeŶt… just ďǇ estaďlishiŶg soŵe 
sĐieŶtifiĐ faĐt aďout hoǁ the ǁoƌld is oƌ ǁas oƌ ǁill ďe.͛ ;Ϯϲ-7) 
 
The second chapter deals directlǇ ǁith the seĐoŶd aspeĐt of DǁoƌkiŶ͛s ƌeligious attitude: the ďelief 
that the universe is objectively beautiful. Dworkin cites Einstein, who felt equipped to describe himself 
as ͚ƌeligious͛, despite his atheisŵ, aŶd “piŶoza, a so-Đalled ͚paŶtheist͛ ǁho equated God with nature. 
The Đlaiŵ that Ŷatuƌe is ďeautiful is Ŷot that Ŷatuƌe pƌoduĐes ďeautiful thiŶgs, ďut ƌatheƌ that it is ͚a 
source of ďeautǇ͛ ;ϰϴ, eŵphasis addedͿ. IŶ ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐ fashioŶ, DǁoƌkiŶ ŵakes this poiŶt ǁith aŶ 
appeal to our pre-existing convictions. We would not find the Grand Canyon wondrous if we 
discovered that it was man-ŵade, so the GƌaŶd CaŶǇoŶ ĐaŶ͛t just happeŶ to ďe a ďeautiful thiŶg ŵade 
by nature; it is beautiful because it is natural. Of course, this appeal to intuition does not prove 
anything, but it must be enough to give even the most ardent naturalist pause for thought. 
Insofar as anyone might not be convinced, Dworkin seems content simply to leave them 
ďehiŶd. If Ǉou doŶ͛t eǆpeƌieŶĐe a seŶse of ǁoŶdeƌ at the suďliŵe, theŶ Ǉou just doŶ͛t shaƌe DǁoƌkiŶ͛s 
ǀieǁpoiŶt. DǁoƌkiŶ͛s positioŶ heƌe is esseŶtiallǇ the saŵe as it is ǁith ethiĐs: if Ǉou͛ƌe lookiŶg foƌ pƌoof 
theŶ Ǉou͛ƌe askiŶg the ǁƌoŶg ƋuestioŶ. His Đlaiŵ that the uŶiǀeƌse is objectively beautiful might be 
more controversial than a claim about objective morality, since there are many people who accept 
moral truth while believing beauty to be simply a matter of taste. But think back to the example. If 
someone said, upon discovering that the Grand Canyon was man-made, that his wonder remained 
uŶdiŵiŶished, ǁouldŶ͛t ǁe saǇ, Ŷot oŶlǇ that his taste ǁas diffeƌeŶt to ouƌs, ďut that he had soŵehoǁ 
missed the point? 
DǁoƌkiŶ Đlaiŵs that the idea of ĐosŵiĐ ďeautǇ should seƌǀe as a pƌesuŵptioŶ iŶ phǇsiĐists͛ 
research, so that the scientific search for elegant unifying theories cannot be explained merely as a 
search for truth, but also as a search for beauty (64). He then asks: what kind of beauty could this be? 
His answer is that the universe is beautiful because it is inevitable. The beauty of the universe lies in 
the interconnectedness of everything ͚iŶ the ǀastŶess of spaĐe aŶd iŶ the ŵiŶutiae of eǆisteŶĐe… so 
that ŶothiŶg Đould ďe diffeƌeŶt ǁithout theƌe ďeiŶg ŶothiŶg͛ ;ϵϴͿ. Just as theƌe is a seŶse iŶ ǁhiĐh eaĐh 
brushstroke, chord or sentence seems essential to a great work of art, so each of the laws of physics 
seem, at least to religious atheists, an indispensable part of physical reality as a whole. 
In chapter three, Dworkin is in more familiar political/legal philosopher mode, addressing the 
question of whether the guarantees of freedom of religion that exist in many constitutions should be 
limited to theistic opinions, or whether religious atheists should enjoy equal protection. He accepts 
that, foƌ ŵost people, ͚ƌeligioŶ͛ is restricted to theism (107-8), but those who are familiar with 
DǁoƌkiŶ͛s legal ǁƌitiŶgs ǁill kŶoǁ that he does Ŷot take legal iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ to ďe a ŵatteƌ of ďƌiŶgiŶg 
out ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ shaƌed uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs. It is a Ŷoƌŵatiǀe ƋuestioŶ: ͚Hoǁ ŵust ǁe uŶdeƌstand the 
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concept of religion if we are to justify the assumption that freedom of religion is an important basic 
ƌight?͛ ;ϭϬϵͿ 
Dworkin grounds the right to religious freedom in a familiar liberal foundation: a government 
that prohibits people from respecting religious duties insults their dignity and self-respect (113). Yet 
atheists often have convictions of duty which are, for them, equally imperative (114). He therefore 
concludes that there is no reason why it should be wrong to take sides between orthodox theistic 
religions, but not between other types of views of what counts as living well (115). 
Rather than ground a right to religious freedom in a particular definition of religion, then, 
DǁoƌkiŶ suggests that the ƌight is aŶ iŶstaŶtiatioŶ of the ŵoƌe geŶeƌal ƌight to ͚ethiĐal iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe͛ 
(132). Although this view supports most widely held liberal positions (it condemns official displays of 
religious insignia on public buildings, but protects the right of private citizens to wear religious dress; 
it ĐoŶdeŵŶs ĐoŵpulsoƌǇ pƌaǇeƌ iŶ sĐhools, ďut peƌŵits adoptiŶg ͞a ŵoŵeŶt of sileŶĐe͟ foƌ Ƌuiet 
reflection; it forbids the teaching of creationism or intelligent design as an alternative to Darwinism), 
it has some consequences that we might find surprising. For example, Dworkin believes the US 
Supreme Court was right to decide in Oregon v Smith (494 US 872 (1990)) that Native American peyote 
smokers were not entitled to an exemption from drug laws on the ground that peyote plays a role in 
theiƌ ƌeligious ƌituals. To fiŶd otheƌǁise, he saǇs, ǁould ďe to disĐƌiŵiŶate agaiŶst ͚sĐeptiĐal hippies͛ 
ǁho ͚just ǁaŶt to get high͛ ;ϭϯϱͿ. 
In the final chapter Dworkin addresses perhaps the most difficult subject of all: death. 
Religious atheism turns out to have a sort of godless afterlife; though nothing like the heaven of 
traditional religions. Athiestic immortality does Ŷot iŶǀolǀe liǀiŶg foƌeǀeƌ, Ŷot ͚oŶ OlǇŵpus oƌ eǀeŶ iŶ 
aŶ apaƌtŵeŶt͛ ;ϭϱϲͿ. But the ǀalue of a life ǁell liǀed ĐaŶŶot ďe destƌoǇed. If ǁe liǀe ǁell, ǁe aĐhieǀe 
a foƌŵ of iŵŵoƌtalitǇ. ͚That is a ƌeligious ĐoŶǀiĐtioŶ if aŶǇthiŶg is.͛ ;ϭϱϵͿ 
I cannot possibly hope to comment on all of the arguments Dworkin raises in the book – it 
may be short in pages but it is certainly not short on ideas – aŶd ǁhile the ďook͛s ŵaiŶ Đlaiŵ, that aŶ 
atheistiĐ ǀieǁpoiŶt ŵight Ŷeǀeƌtheless ǁaƌƌaŶt the title ͚ƌeligious͛, ĐeƌtaiŶly deserves a prolonged 
discussion, as I find myself entirely persuaded by Dworkin on this front I am probably not the right 
person to attempt this. Instead I shall restrict myself mainly to elucidating what I see as central aspects 
of DǁoƌkiŶ͛s thought, ŵaking connections that are not explicit in the text, and suggesting directions 
iŶ ǁhiĐh DǁoƌkiŶ͛s ideas ŵight ďe Ǉet fuƌtheƌ deǀeloped. That is Ŷot to saǇ that I haǀe ŶothiŶg ĐƌitiĐal 
to say about the book, and I shall conclude with some comments that pick a Ƌuaƌƌel ǁith DǁoƌkiŶ͛s 
tƌeatŵeŶt of ͚fƌeedoŵ of ƌeligioŶ͛ as a politiĐal aŶd ĐoŶstitutioŶal ƌight. 
 
Coherence and Responsibility 
CoheƌeŶĐe ĐleaƌlǇ plaǇs a huge ƌole iŶ DǁoƌkiŶ͛s philosophǇ. AŵoŶg laǁǇeƌs, DǁoƌkiŶ is ďest kŶoǁŶ 
for his theory of law as integrity, according to which we answer a legal problem by constructing an 
account of the various principles in play so that the entire legal system can be seen as a coherent 
ǁhole. He is also, of Đouƌse, a stƌoŶg adǀoĐate of the ͚hedgehog͛ thesis that ǁe should think of our 
entire catalogue of values not as a miscellaneous and potentially contradictory list, but as a complex 
unity. Now we see that, for Dworkin, the very beauty of the universe lies in its integrity. Clearly, in 
none of these fields is coherence self-evident, or rationally demonstrable. Rather, across each domain 
we are enjoined to strive foƌ ĐoheƌeŶĐe. WhiĐh giǀes ƌise to the ĐhalleŶge eǆpƌessed ďǇ ͚ĐƌitiĐal͛ 
lawyers, value pluralists and sceptical physicists: why should we suppose that coherence is 
aĐhieǀaďle? “houldŶ͛t ǁe just leaƌŶ to ͚aĐĐept Natuƌe as “he is – aďsuƌd͛? (Feynman 2006)  
One possibility is that we should strive for coherence because coherence is beautiful. On this 
view, physicists searching for a unified theory are embarking on a religious quest: it is their faith in 
cosmic beauty that drives them to seek coherence. This seems close to what Dworkin suggests when 
he talks about beauty guiding scientific research. But it does a poor job of explaining why we should 
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seek coherence in morality or law. For although it might seem plausible that we ought to select the 
most elegant of competing scientific theories on aesthetic grounds, few would argue that it would be 
proper to resolve a moral dilemma, or make a court ruling, based on what one believed was most 
beautiful.1  
Why is wrong to resolve moral or legal questions on aesthetic grounds? A tempting answer is 
that it will simply lead us to make the wrong decisions. But this simply begs the question by 
presupposing that the right answer exists independently of aesthetic considerations. If the proper way 
to resolve dilemmas is to resort to aesthetic elegance, then the beautiful answer is the right answer.  
Instead, I believe (and I think Dworkin also believed) that beauty cannot be the controlling 
value in the normative realm since this would amount to an evasion of responsibility. Deciding 
normative questions on aesthetic grounds shifts the issue onto a different ground entirely. In doing so 
we decline to deal with the dilemma that we are presented with; like an undergraduate struggling 
with an exam, instead of trying to tackle the question in front of us we give an answer to an easier 
one. 
This poiŶts us toǁaƌds ǁhat I ďelieǀe DǁoƌkiŶ͛s ƌeal aŶsǁeƌ is. It is responsibility itself that 
requires that we suppose that coherence is achievable in our scientific, moral and legal practices. The 
ĐeŶtƌalitǇ of the idea of ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ to DǁoƌkiŶ͛s thought ĐaŶŶot ďe oǀeƌstated. It is appaƌeŶt fƌoŵ 
the structure of Justice for Hedgehogs: before the sections on ethics, morality and politics, Dworkin 
talks about moral responsibility and its connection with epistemology (2011, chap. 6). Dworkin argues 
that responsibility is important because it is what our self-respect requires. One cannot enjoy self-
ƌespeĐt uŶless oŶe ďelieǀes that ǁhat oŶe does ǁith oŶe͛s life matters, i.e. without accepting 
ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ foƌ oŶe͛s aĐtioŶs, ďeliefs, etĐ.. ;Tƌue to foƌŵ, DǁoƌkiŶ pƌeseŶts us ǁith aŶ eǆaŵple that 
ƌeaĐhes to ouƌ eǆistiŶg ĐoŶǀiĐtioŶs: ͚MaĐďeth fouŶd iŶternal scepticism – indifference to the rest of 
his life – once he realized he was in the hands of supernatural tricksters. You are not, I expect, of his 
ŵiŶd.͛ (2011, 209)) Responsibility requires that agents act with integrity, and that they treat important 
decisions with the gravity that they deserve. But in difficult cases we find that our convictions are 
disordered and our values vague and unhelpful. We might sense that diverse values pull us in different 
directions, so that there is no right answer to how we should act. For value pluralists, there is, 
sometimes at least, nothing more to say than this. For Dworkin, however, this sense is the starting-
point, not the conclusion. Responsibility requires that we try our best to ascertain what is required of 
us. The only way we can do this is by striving for coherence among our various moral convictions. 
Nevertheless, it might be argued, the fact that we have reason to strive for coherence does 
not mean that coherence is attainable. IsŶ͛t it iƌƌespoŶsiďle to pƌesuppose that there is an ideal 
ĐoheƌeŶĐe of ǀalues, ǁheŶ it ŵight tuƌŶ out that theƌe isŶ͛t? Heƌe ǁe Ŷeed to ďe oŶ guaƌd foƌ the 
return of grounded realism. We cannot know that our values conflict, except through an argument 
that persuades us that that is so. Any such argument is going to be open to criticism. Similarly, 
͚sĐieŶtists Đould Ŷeǀeƌ haǀe aŶǇ ƌeasoŶ at all to suppose, at aŶǇ poiŶt iŶ the eoŶs of phǇsiĐs to Đoŵe, 
that they had actually reached the stopping point, that they were finally up against a ǁall of ǁeiƌdŶess͛ 
(80). Responsibility does not allow us to rest on our laurels and assume we have reached the end of 
intellectual history, but rather it requires that we accept that our theories are works in progress, open 
to further development and refinement. If so, then we will always view a conflict between values, or 
a sĐieŶtifiĐallǇ uŶeǆplaiŶed ͚ŵessiŶess͛, as a shoƌtĐoŵiŶg iŶ ouƌ theoƌetiĐal appaƌatus iŶ ǁaŶt of a 
remedy. The concept of ideal coherence acts as a regulative idea to spur us on to continually improve 
our theories. We can accept it, responsibly, because we could never be in a position to know that we 
must reject it. 
 
Beauty, Acceptability and Truth 
A. Latham 
 
Dworkin discusses, only to dismiss, the view held by Hawking that beauty is part of the definition of 
truth in science. Dworkin quotes a passage by Hawking that merits reproduction: 
 
͚WheŶ… a [sĐieŶtifiĐ] ŵodel is suĐĐessful at eǆplaiŶiŶg eǀeŶts, ǁe teŶd to attƌiďute to it, aŶd 
to the elements and concepts that constitute it, the quality of reality or absolute truth. But 
there may be different ways in which one could model the same physical situation, with each 
employing different fundamental elements and concepts. If two such physical theories or 
models accurately predict the same events, oŶe ĐaŶŶot ďe said to ďe ŵoƌe ƌeal thaŶ the otheƌ.͛ 
(2010, 7)  
 
In this case, the fact that a model is beautiful is reason for us to accept it as true ahead of its less 
elegant rivals. 
DǁoƌkiŶ͛s disŵissal of this ǀieǁ is, to ŵǇ ŵiŶd, Đuƌious. He ďats it aside ďǇ saǇiŶg that ͚ŵost 
phǇsiĐists aƌe ǁoƌkiŶg ƌealists͛ ;ϱϳͿ, i.e. theǇ ďelieǀe that theƌe is aŶ oďjeĐtiǀe ƌealitǇ that is 
independent of the beauty of that reality, and that when they say that the cosmos is beautiful, they 
aƌe ŵakiŶg ͚a dƌaŵatiĐ Đlaiŵ aďout ƌealitǇ͛, Ŷot ŵeƌelǇ ͚a seŵaŶtiĐ poiŶt aďout the defiŶitioŶ of tƌuth 
iŶ sĐieŶĐe͛ ;ϱϱͿ. But doesŶ͛t this aƌguŵeŶt ƌelǇ oŶ ouƌ aĐĐeptiŶg, iŶ the ƌealŵ of sĐieŶĐe, the ͚ gƌouŶded 
realisŵ͛ that DǁoƌkiŶ ǁould haǀe us ƌejeĐt iŶ the ƌealŵ of ŵoƌalitǇ? HaǁkiŶg͛s aƌguŵeŶt is oŶlǇ a 
seŵaŶtiĐ oŶe ;iŶ the pejoƌatiǀe seŶse that DǁoƌkiŶ iŶteŶdsͿ if ǁe take the ͚defiŶitioŶ of tƌuth iŶ 
sĐieŶĐe͛ as soŵethiŶg pƌioƌ to sĐieŶtifiĐ iŶƋuiƌǇ, i.e. as a kiŶd of foundational presupposition. Certainly 
if we determine in advance of scientific inquiry that the discovery of scientific truth involves the 
discovery of beauty, then Dworkin would be right to say that the subsequent discovery of beauty 
ǁould Ŷot ďe ͚a dƌaŵatiĐ Đlaiŵ aďout ƌealitǇ͛. But if ǁe aĐĐept uŶgƌouŶded ƌealisŵ, theŶ suƌelǇ ǁe 
cannot view the definition of truth in science as insulated from the results of scientific inquiry. We 
have no Archimedean point on which to stand: each conviction we hold within a domain of inquiry – 
including the standards for truth in that domain – must be sensitive to every other conviction. So the 
claim that beauty is part of the definition of truth in science can be as much of a conclusion from our 
scientific inquiry as it is a prerequisite for such inquiry.  
Dworkin says that scientists should not search for beauty as truth, but rather for beauty and 
tƌuth. He aĐĐepts HaǁkiŶg͛s Đlaiŵ that, if ŵultiple ŵodels aĐĐuƌatelǇ pƌediĐt the saŵe eǀeŶts, ǁe haǀe 
reason to accept the ŵodel that is ŵost elegaŶt; DǁoƌkiŶ͛s Ƌuaƌƌel ǁith HaǁkiŶg ĐoŶĐeƌŶs ǁhetheƌ 
the elegaŶĐe of the ŵodel speaks to the ŵodel͛s truth. In distinguishing between the acceptability of 
a theoƌǇ aŶd the theoƌǇ͛s tƌuth, DǁoƌkiŶ seeŵs to Đoŵŵit hiŵself to a Đoƌƌespondence theory 
according to which a scientific theory is true if it correctly describes reality. But what reason could we 
have for believing that there exists some external reality to which our scientific models correspond? 
If ͚theƌe is Ŷo fiŶallǇ ŶoŶĐircular way to certify our capacity to find truth of any kind in any intellectual 
doŵaiŶ͛ ;ϭϲ), shouldŶ͛t DǁoƌkiŶ also ƌejeĐt the idea of aŶ eǆteƌŶal ƌealŵ of phǇsiĐal faĐts? If to saǇ 
that a moral theory is true is simply to say that we should accept it, then why does not the same apply 
to a scientific theory? I am not saying that it is necessarily incoherent to reject a correspondence 
theory of truth in the moral domain while accepting it in the scientific, but Dworkin does not give a 
proper explanation foƌ his doiŶg so. It seeŵs to ŵe that the logiĐ of DǁoƌkiŶ͛s ŵetaethiĐs poiŶts 
toǁaƌds aĐĐeptaŶĐe of PeiƌĐe͛s siŵple foƌŵula that tƌuth is the eŶd of iŶƋuiƌǇ,2 so that to say that 
science should aim at the discovery of beauty is to say that beauty is part of the definition of truth, 
Ŷot iŶ a ƌeduĐtiǀe oƌ ͚seŵaŶtiĐ͛ seŶse, ďut ƌatheƌ iŶ the falliďilistiĐ seŶse that the ĐuƌƌeŶt state of ouƌ 
scientific knowledge justifies the presumption that scientific inquiry ought to aim at the discovery of 
ďeautǇ. OŶ PeiƌĐe͛s aĐĐouŶt of tƌuth, at least, HaǁkiŶg͛s aŶd DǁoƌkiŶ͛s positioŶs seeŵ to aŵouŶt to 
the same thing. 
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Beauty, Coherence and Personification 
Dworkin locates the beauty of the universe in its inevitability, which he links with the shielded strong 
iŶtegƌitǇ of the laǁs of phǇsiĐs: ͚ƌeasoŶs… emerge from the theory itself showing that the idea of prior 
eǆplaŶatioŶ ĐaŶŶot aƌise ďeĐause it ŵakes Ŷo seŶse͛ ;ϴϳͿ. This, DǁoƌkiŶ Đlaiŵs, ŵeaŶs that the 
universe is beautiful in a deeper sense than would be the case if nature just happened to make 
ďeautiful thiŶgs, iŶ ǁhiĐh Đase the uŶiǀeƌse ǁould ďe ďeautiful ďǇ ŵeƌe ͚ĐoiŶĐideŶĐe͛ ;ϱϮͿ. But if ouƌ 
focus is only on the inevitability of the physical realm, then we are only looking at half the puzzle. To 
say that it is inevitable that the universe is the way that it is is not quite the same as saying that it is 
inevitably beautiful. For although we may find beauty in its inevitability, it does not follow that it is 
inevitable that ǁe fiŶd ďeautǇ iŶ iŶeǀitaďilitǇ. It Đould still ďe oŶlǇ a ͚ĐoiŶĐideŶĐe͛ that ǁe fiŶd 
inevitability beautiful. In order for the universe to be beautiful in a truly non-contingent way, both the 
physical realm and the beauty of the universe need shielded strong integrity. What could give cosmic 
aesthetics such integrity? 
Religious theists have a straightforward answer: human beings were deliberately created in 
such a way that they can perceive the inherently beautiful divine order. Their sense of cosmic beauty 
is no coincidence: the same intelligence that created the beautiful universe also created human 
beings, as part of that universe, so that they could perceive such beauty. But this argument is not open 
to the religious atheist, who must concede that people͛s seŶse of ďeautǇ is the ƌesult of aŶ 
evolutionary process, and socio-historical factors, that were not purposively set in order and thus 
seem to be, in a sense, contingent.3  
Dworkin does not address the question of why inevitability is beautiful, he merely takes it as 
a fact that we tend to consider it so. He gives us no reason to believe cosmic aesthetics has shielded 
strong integrity. However, I believe that a potential argument (I put it no higher than that) can be 
identified by considering aŶ aŶalogǇ ǁith DǁoƌkiŶ͛s aƌguŵeŶt foƌ ĐoheƌeŶĐe iŶ laǁ. IŶ Laǁ’s Eŵpire, 
DǁoƌkiŶ Đlaiŵed that the ĐoheƌeŶĐe ;oƌ ͚iŶtegƌitǇ͛Ϳ of the laǁ is ǀaluaďle ďeĐause it alloǁs the legal 
community itself to be personified, i.e. portrayed as a moral agent with its own principles and ideals 
(1986, 167-75). By analogy, one could argue that the fundamental coherence of physical laws into one 
master theory enables the universe itself to be seen as if it were the product of a single agent. That 
we find this beautiful, the aƌguŵeŶt goes, is Ŷot a ͚ĐoiŶĐideŶĐe͛, it folloǁs ŶeĐessaƌilǇ fƌoŵ the kiŶd 
of beings that we are, i.e. purposive agents. We view nature as wondrous because we can view it as 
͚ŵotheƌ͛ of all thiŶgs, eǀeŶ if ǁe ƌejeĐt the idea that theƌe eǆists aŶǇ liteƌal ŵother, or father, that 
created it. We view a coherent universe as analogous to a work of art because we see nature as 
aŶalogous to aŶ aƌtist. OŶ the otheƌ haŶd, ǁe ĐouldŶ͛t ŵake this ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ if ǁe ǁeƌe foƌĐed to 
aĐĐept Ŷatuƌe as ͚aďsuƌd͛: Ŷatuƌe ǁould ďe analogous not to Shakespeare but to a monkey with a 
typewriter. Of course, this line of reasoning comes close to a common argument for the existence of 
God, according to which the universe is such as can only be explained as the creation of an intelligent 
actor. Perhaps, then – and I stress here I am only speculating about a possible line of thought – if the 
link between coherence and personification holds up, the connection between theism and religious 
atheism becomes closer still. 
 
Religion and the Constitution 
DǁoƌkiŶ͛s ǀieǁ that tƌaditioŶal defiŶitioŶs of ƌeligioŶ ƌeƋuiƌe the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt to Đhoose between 
ĐitizeŶs͛ siŶĐeƌe ĐoŶǀiĐtioŶs to deĐide ǁhiĐh aƌe ǁoƌthǇ of speĐial pƌoteĐtioŶ seeŵs to oǀeƌlook aŶ 
alternative: that when it comes to the significance of various convictions, the government refer to 
iŶdiǀiduals’ oǁŶ ǀieǁs. CaŶ͛t goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ŵake distiŶĐtioŶs aĐĐoƌdiŶg to iŶdiǀiduals͛ oǁŶ staŶdaƌds 
ǁithout ͚ĐoŶtƌadiĐt[iŶg] the ďasiĐ pƌiŶĐiple that ƋuestioŶs of fuŶdaŵeŶtal ǀalue aƌe a ŵatteƌ of 
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individual, Ŷot ĐolleĐtiǀe, ĐhoiĐe͛? I ďƌieflǇ ǁaŶt to suggest that a Đloseƌ eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of ƌeligious ǀieǁs 
may cause trouble for the way Dworkin treats freedom of religion as a constitutional right. 
DǁoƌkiŶ͛s aƌguŵeŶt that fƌeedoŵ of ƌeligioŶ does Ŷot ǁaƌƌaŶt any particular constitutional 
protection per se relies heavily on the idea that the same kinds of value commitments can be found in 
atheistic religion as in theistic religion. But might a theist not argue that value commitments are 
qualitatively different by virtue of being linked to or derived from a god? Dworkin looks to sidestep 
this kiŶd of aƌguŵeŶt ďǇ his iŶǀoĐatioŶ of Huŵe͛s laǁ: siŶĐe Ŷoƌŵatiǀe pƌopositioŶs ĐaŶŶot ďe deƌiǀed 
fƌoŵ puƌe faĐts, a god͛s eǆisteŶĐe ĐaŶ featuƌe oŶlǇ as a ŵiŶoƌ pƌeŵise iŶ aŶ argument which already 
presupposes the possibility of value. But while this argument might be persuasive from some theists, 
foƌ otheƌs it ǁill just shift the field of disagƌeeŵeŶt. Afteƌ all, ǁhat ŵakes Huŵe͛s laǁ so fuŶdaŵeŶtal? 
It represents, after all, a distinctively modern viewpoint, which would have been completely alien to 
ancients and medievals. Aristotle was characteristic of his time in viewing the cosmos as a meaningful 
order, pregnant with value in and of itself. Only in the modern viewpoint are subject and object – and 
thus ͚ought͛ aŶd ͚is͛ – entirely separable entities. Is it inconceivable that some religious theists retain 
a version of the premodern view? My purpose here is not to attack the modernist position, but only 
to cast doubt on DworkiŶ͛s assuŵptioŶ that the ƌeal disagƌeeŵeŶt ďetǁeeŶ theists aŶd atheists ͚is 
oŶlǇ aŶ esoteƌiĐ kiŶd of sĐieŶtifiĐ disagƌeeŵeŶt ǁith Ŷo ŵoƌal oƌ politiĐal iŵpliĐatioŶs͛ ;ϭϰϳͿ. GiǀeŶ his 
ƌejeĐtioŶ of uŶgƌouŶded ƌealisŵ, DǁoƌkiŶ suƌelǇ ĐaŶŶot ĐoŶsideƌ Huŵe͛s laǁ to be immune from 
criticism.4  
Dworkin also appears to overlook the distinction between those practices which are taken as 
religious obligations and those that are taken to be non-obligatory components of the good life. When 
we take this distinction into account, there is a clear difference between those engaging in Huichol 
rituals from curious hippies. Hippies might hold the view that their life is improved by their choosing 
to take hallucinogenic drugs. But many Huichol will not view their participation in religious rituals as a 
matter of choice. Rather, they will be what Sandel (1998) has Đalled ͚eŶĐuŵďeƌed selǀes͛: peƌsoŶs foƌ 
whom the observance of religious duties is an end constitutive to their selfhood, indispensable to their 
identity. Contra Dworkin, an exemption for the Huichol from drug control laws would not discriminate 
oŶ ƌeligious gƌouŶds agaiŶst ͚those ǁho oŶlǇ ǁaŶt to get high͛ ;ϭϮϲͿ. ‘atheƌ it ǁould ŵake a 
distinction based on a real difference. Compliance with a perceived obligation is qualitatively different 
to ŵakiŶg a siŵple ĐhoiĐe, eǀeŶ if the ĐhoiĐe is ŵotiǀated ďǇ the Đhooseƌ͛s siŶĐeƌe ďelief that it ǁill 
improve her objective well-being. This difference must be taken into account if we are to treat people 
as equals, rather than merely treating them equally. 5  (Of course, the hippies might also claim that 
peyote-smoking was not a choice but an obligation constitutive to their selfhood, in which case we 
would have to decide whether to believe them.) 
Now religious atheists may also doubt Huŵe͛s laǁ, aŶd ŵight also ďe eŶĐuŵďeƌed selǀes. 
Thus my comments here do not cast doubt on the category of religious atheism. But I feel that 
attention as to the diversity of views that others actually hold makes the situation a little more 
complex than DǁoƌkiŶ͛s ďƌoad ďƌush ĐoŶstitutioŶal aƌguŵeŶts suggest. DǁoƌkiŶ is ƌight that theist 
views are not eo ipso worthy of special protection. But it does not necessarily follow that there is no 
useful constitutional category of the religious. 
 
Conclusion 
Religion without God is a profound and, ultimately, moving piece, pƌeseŶted iŶ DǁoƌkiŶ͛s 
characteristically witty and engaging prose. While those looking for a rigorous treatment of competing 
arguments will find themselves disappointed, readers are treated to a fine exposition of a particular 
way of looking at the world. DǁoƌkiŶ͛s aŵďitioŶ, ĐleaƌlǇ, is to pƌaĐtiĐe as he pƌeaĐhes: to Đƌeate out 
of a jumble of arguments and convictions a simple, elegant and persuasive unifying theory. Although 
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DǁoƌkiŶ͛s aŶiŵus is optiŵistiĐ, eǀeŶ ƌoŵaŶtiĐ, he continually subjects his convictions to rigorous 
analytical testing. He strives for, and often achieves, beauty in the particular as well as beauty in the 
whole. In the end, whether one is persuaded will depeŶd upoŶ ǁhetheƌ oŶe shaƌes DǁoƌkiŶ͛s faith. 
That is, after all, what religion is about. 
 
Notes 
1. Though some have argued this, or at least something like this: see, for example, Rancière (2004) and 
Douzinas and Nead (1999). I cannot do justice to views of this sort here. 
2. See Misak (2004). Interestingly, Misak has recently placed Quine in this pragmatist lineage (2013, chap 
11) (I am grateful to Chris Macleod for this reference). 
3. I saǇ ͚iŶ a seŶse͛ ĐoŶtiŶgeŶt, siŶĐe iŶ the physical sense they are not contingent but predetermined by 
the laws of physics which are (arguendo at least) inevitable. The physical sense of inevitability cannot 
provide cosmic beauty with shielded strong integrity, since that would render the judgment that the 
universe was beautiful a non sequitur. It would amount to no more than saying that the universe was 
such as to make the presence of beings who believe it to be beautiful inevitable. This would be to 
destroy, not buttress, the objective (i.e. mind-independent) concept of aesthetics. 
4. CoŶtƌast CoheŶ, ǁho takes ;a paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ stƌoŶg ǀeƌsioŶ ofͿ Huŵe͛s laǁ to ďe iŶheƌeŶt iŶ ͚the sort of 
ĐoŶĐept that justiĐe is͛ ;ϮϬϬϴ, 292), but who relies on an ultimately unsustainable Platonism about 
value. 
5. The terminology for this distinction is from Dworkin (2013, 227). 
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